This article from the magazine Self
& Society by Lavinia Gomez (available here in full with her permission)
formulates in clear terms the tensions between humanistic and psychodynamic
perspectives which anyone trying to integrate the two has to struggle
with. It manages to avoid traditional oversimplifications, misunderstandings
and mutual prejudices which were part and parcel of the polarisation between
these perspectives. Lavinia traces the development of non-interpretative
techniques (of which there is a great variety and range, developed and
used by humanistic therapies) back to the early days of psychoanalysis
and the work of Ferenczi. She points out the dangers of these techniques.
Out of a consideration of an opposite therapeutic position
(which recognises and uses the transference) versus an alongside
position (which uses these more active, directive techniques freely)
she suggests the notion of containment as a crucial ingredient
in the therapeutic process. Michael Soth has written
a response to her article ('Integrating humanistic techniques into a transference-countertransference
perspective') in which he agrees with her about the importance of
the transference and containment. In addition he suggests a perspective
where - under certain conditions - these two principles can be integrated
with non-interpretative techniques (as used in Gestalt and Body Psychotherapy).
HUMANISTIC OR PSYCHODYNAMIC
-
what is the difference
and do we have to make a choice ?
by Lavinia Gomez - Self
& Society Vol. 31 No.6 Feb/Mar 2004
A therapeutic crossroads
My client is a young woman,
white, middle-class and well-educated. She came into therapy because
she feels unable to proceed in any direction with her work life, or
make meaningful contact with anyone apart from her partner; she has
been very unhappy for a long, long time. In sessions, she often lapses
into silence, unable to move or speak. Sometimes we can talk around
this, and it soon became clear to both of us that this state reflects
her inner relationship with her mother. She knows that her parents love
her, and she loves them; but she grew up without really questioning
that how she thinks, feels and acts must match what her mother expects
and can cope with. Otherwise, and particularly if anger is involved,
she is overwhelmed with foreboding and terrible guilt. Coming into therapy
has brought these dangerous feelings to the fore; but it is as though
I am her mother, and so she cannot speak.
As I sit with my client in her agony of self-consciousness, I have a
choice to make. I could introduce an active mode of therapy. We could
take her mother out of me and put her on a cushion where, with my encouragement,
she might be able to develop communication back and forth. Alternatively,
we might explore the acute bodily tensions that are part of her paralysed
state, to help her give voice to what they are mutely saying. I would
be taking the choice of standing alongside my client so that
we could face her problems together. We would be locating those problems
essentially outside the therapeutic relationship.
Or I could follow the other route. Instead of detaching her sense of
her mother from me, we could leave it where it is. My client would then
be encountering her mother in me, as it were, giving her the chance
of resolving her difficulties live, in her own way. I would
be taking the choice of standing opposite my client,and her problems
would be likely to become concentrated within the therapeutic relationship.
When I refer to the alongside and opposite approaches,
or the alongside and opposite therapeutic positions,
this is what I mean.This would usually be seen as an example of the
humanistic-psychoanalytic divide. Many people would say that a humanistic
therapist would position himself alongside the client and work actively,
and a psychoanalytic therapist would place himself opposite the client
and refrain from active interventions. (Well leave aside the integrative
option for the moment.)
But is it that simple? No-one can deny that there are deep disjunctures
between modes of therapeutic practice. Bioenergetics is a very different
animal from classical psychoanalysis, for example, and the two could
not be amalgamated without modifications which proponents of each
approach would see as outright mutilation. But it would be no easier
to combine bioenergetics with a pure person-centred approach; yet
both are classified as humanistic psychotherapies, while psychoanalysis
is generally not. So incompatible approaches do not necessarily fall
on different sides of the humanistic-psychoanalytic gulf. Nor do the
alongside and opposite positions exactly match
up to humanistic and psychoanalytic approaches. It is difficult to
see how any approach other than the psychoanalytic could be conducted
from the opposite position; but this is not because it
is impossible in principle, but because no competitor theory has developed
which works in the same way. However, the alongside position
can be taken up by a psychodynamic therapist as easily as any other.
Rather than standing opposite the client and working directly
through the transference, the therapists perceptions of the
transference dimension can be used to inform therapeutic interventions
in exactly the same way as any other theoretical system. In fact,
this reflects the different ways in which the terms psychodynamic
and psychoanalytic are generally used. Both use the same
body of theory, but in psychodynamic psychotherapy, the
therapist stays outside the transference and works alongside the client,
while the psychoanalytic psychotherapist positions himself
opposite the client and works through the transference. So things
are more complicated than they might appear.
There are three main points Im going to be suggesting. First,
that there is no essential divide between a psychodynamic and a humanistic
approach, because there is nothing to stop psychoanalysis from being
included as a humanistic psychotherapy: we do not necessarily have to
choose between the humanistic and psychoanalytic or psychodynamic labels.
Second, that there is, nevertheless, a crucial difference between a
therapy which depends on the therapist working alongside the client,
and one which depends on the therapist working opposite the client;
I believe we do have to choose which therapeutic position we are primarily
going to work through in relation to each individual client. This difference
is not the same as the humanistic/ psychoanalytic divide, but represents
a conflict going all the way back to Freuds psychoanalysis. Third,
that choosing one or other position does not settle the matter. Taking
either to an extreme carries grisly therapeutic hazards, and all approaches
have to find a way of bearing each of them in mind. I hope to convey
how my main theoretical touchstone, Object Relations, developed out
of the psychoanalytic conflict of approaches to offer one way of thinking
about this tension through concepts such as containment and therapeutic
presence.
The Division - humanistic or
psychodynamic, or humanistic and psychodynamic ?
My main point here
is that there is nothing in the humanistic approach that rules out a
psychodynamic orientation or the psychoanalytic method, and nothing
in the psychoanalytic approach that rules out the humanistic spirit.
It is not the same in reverse: there is plenty in the psychoanalytic
approach that is incompatible with many humanistic methods, and most
humanistic methods run counter to the psychoanalytic approach.
The words alone tell us this. Humanistic is a 17th century
term which in itself means nothing more than concerned with human
matters: Sometimes this implied human rather than divine matters,
sometimes human rather than scientific matters; often, it involved faith
in the human species as capable of moral and social progress. All these
meanings are picked up in the range of views represented in the field
of humanistic psychotherapy. Psychodynamic, meanwhile, merely
describes the psyche as dynamic or active, and psychoanalytic
simply says that it is complex, or capable of being analysed. This makes
the humanistic category by far the bigger bag; the idea that the psyche
is active and complex is a human matter, but there is more to human
matters than the nature of psychical processes.Of course, this is begging
the question: it is not how they define themselves today. In the directory
of the UK Council for Psychotherapy, the Psychoanalytic and
Psychodynamic Section describes itself through the derivation of
its theories:
These therapies are based on psychoanalytic theory and practice.
The central principle is that much distress has been caused by events
in early life which we are no longer aware of. The therapy offers a
reliable setting for the patient to explore free associations, memories,
phantasies, feelings and dreams, to do with past and present. Particular
attention is given to the interaction with the therapist, through which
the patient may relive situations from their early life, the transference.
In these ways the patient may achieve a new and better resolution of
long-standing conflicts.
No automatic contradiction appears
between the two approaches, and indeed there is considerable common
ground. Most humanistic psychotherapies do not rule out either transference
or unconscious levels of experience nowadays; and while they might
hope for more than the resolving of old conflicts, this would certainly
be one of their aims.
Does psychoanalysis as a
whole pass the humanistic test? According to the Humanistic and
Integrative Section of the directory, Humanistic Psychotherapy
is an approach which tries to do justice to the whole person, including
body, mind and spirit.I dont think we would find a psychoanalytic
approach that would declare that it only tries to work with only part
of the person. It might not define person in the same
terms; but then, nor do many humanistic approaches. The definition
continues:lt represents a broad range of therapeutic methods.
Each method recognises the self-healing capacities of the client and
believes that the greatest expert on the client is the client. The
humanistic psychotherapist works towards an authentic meeting of equals
in the therapy relationship.
Some humanistic psychotherapists rule out psychoanalytic approaches
on these criteria. They object that psychoanalytic practitioners see
only what is pathological, and believe that they themselves are the
real expert on the client; while the obsession with the transference,
they argue, prevents a meeting between equals.
I think these are misunderstandings. Although the emphasis may be different,
psychoanalytic practice depends on supporting, not supplanting, what
is seen as the psyches intrinsic striving for integration; it
is designed to unstick the process of self-development without implanting
new ideas in the mind. Equally, the psychoanalytic practitioner cannot
know in advance the significance of any thought or feeling, dream or
symptom, because it depends entirely on its meaning for the patient.
Where unconscious processes are concerned, the patient may be as much
in the dark as the therapist. But interpretations can only be arrived
at through attunement to the patient and her associations, and are only
confirmed when they click in the patients own emotional
and cognitive recognition, or lead to an undamming of the therapeutic
process. It is the clients unconscious that psychoanalytic approaches
treat as expert. Finally, psychoanalytic psychotherapy relies
on the therapeutic alliance as the stable context for the turmoil of
transference; this is the kind of realistic, co-operative partnership
between more or less equal adults that humanistic psychotherapy espouses.
The aim of psychoanalysis is to move towards the dissolution of the
transference and the possibility of the more real and authentic meeting
between equals that this brings. So I would argue that psychoanalysis
meets these criteria as well.
These are the grounds on which I believe that humanistic psychotherapy
can include psychodynamic and psychoanalytic approaches; and why, working
mainly from a background of Object Relations, I feel entitled to call
myself and be registered as a humanistic psychotherapist as well as
a psychoanalytic therapist. Despite differences in emphasis, I do not
find psychoanalysis to be intrinsically non-humanistic; the humanistic
/ psychoanalytic divide does not go all the way down.
So how did such a rift develop between them?
The Divergence between psychoanalysis
and humanistic psychology
The divergence which
put humanistic psychotherapy on the map was due to factors other than
psychotherapeutic theory. Humanistic psychology arose in 1950s and 60s
America, in reaction to behaviourist and psychoanalytic approaches which
were judged as oppressive, complacent and frankly boring. The growth
movement aimed to make psychotherapy a powerhouse of liberated
individuals. It was part of a general socio-political trend towards
the overthrow of established structures ranging from civil authorities
to the nuclear family, under slogans such as the personal is political,
the sexual revolution and liberation movements for all minority
sections of society. This climate of rebellion was the hub around which
a range of psychologies gathered. These included approaches unrelated
to psychoanalysis, such as those of Maslow and Rogers, as well as those
developed by disaffected analysts such as Perls, Berne and Reich.
What the growth movement did not
do is engage with psychoanalysis in detailed conceptual argument:
this was simply not what it was about. This is often not appreciated
by the psychoanalytic world, which typically used to deride humanistic
practice for its comparative lack of theoretical sophistication. It
tends not to take on board that the humanistic psychology movement
was motivated by emotional rather than intellectual factors, and represents
protest rather than critique.
... and within psychoanalysis
This leaves the theoretical
question unanswered. We still do not know if there is a philosophical
conflict between the two approaches that we have not yet identified.
Amazingly, however, the divergence of the growth movement from psychoanalysis
echoes an earlier controversy along very similar lines and in a very
similar context; and because the conflict took place within psychoanalysis,
the theoretical arguments are easier to make out. The Freud-Ferenczi
dispute was also part of a socio-political movement erupting in the
twenty years following the First World War, as the growth movement was
thrown up in the wake of the second. It failed to overturn the psychoanalytic
status quo, and fizzled out in a mixture of repression by the psychoanalytic
establishment, silent assimilation of some of its values and ideas,
and a general sinking of differences in the run-up to World War II,
to resurface thirty years later as the growth movement.
The 1920s saw an unprecedented radicalisation of psychoanalytic theory
and practice. Inside and outside psychoanalysis, there was a new focus
on society and on the body - both inescapably bound up with a war situation.
The psychoanalytic ego was beginning to be theorised in bodily terms
as ego feeling or ego sensation by Paul Federn,
mentor to Wilhelm Reich. At the same time, psychoanalysis was becoming
more ambitious in its aims. Freud had designed psychoanalysis as a way
of discovering what was in the mind, leaving the use of this knowledge
strictly to the individual. The movement known as political psychoanalysis
suggested it must do more. As well as interpreting the psyche, psychoanalysis
should work to change not just to the individual but the social psyche,
with the 1930s sexual revolution.
This led to a blossoming of creativity within psychoanalysis; but what
proved impossible to either integrate or ignore was the bitter dissension
between Freud and his so-called favourite son, Sandor Ferenczi,
which led to a wholesale backing-off from risk-taking in psychoanalytic
practice. Ferenczi made a sustained effort to reorient the style, focus
and accessibility of psychoanalysis. He complained that psychoanalytic
therapy was becoming an educative rather than a therapeutic
procedure. As the sole medium of psychoanalytic training, analysts routinely
incorporated theoretical teaching and supervision into the analysis
of trainees, and were concerned to make their analytic experience as
rigourous as possible. Ferenczi felt that this had produced a generation
of analysts who duplicated their own experience by prioritising cognitive
understanding over feeling experience, insisting on long and deep
treatments regardless of expense, and misusing their power imposing
punitively rigid boundaries and excessive non-responsiveness under the
banner of therapeutic neutrality. His mission was to extend the range
of patients with whom psychoanalysis could work, and to make it more
effective at less cost in money, time and suffering.
Ferenczis main theoretical innovation was to propose that the
outer causes of neurosis were more, rather than less, important than
the inner causes; and therefore that the vehicle of psychotherapeutic
change must be at least as much external as internal. In a startlingly
early anticipation of Object Relations, he argued that neurosis is the
consequence of a lack of love in early life, and that the effects of
the instinctual imbalance that Freud held ultimately responsible are
negligible by comparison. Accordingly, he set out to make good the deficiency,
on the basis that the deprived patient needs real new experience, rather
than just to gain insight. The ball of therapeutic responsibility is
returned to the therapists court: Psychoanalytic cure is
in direct proportion to the cherishing love given by the psychoanalyst
to the patient, he writes. The therapeutic process might be accelerated,
he thought, through active interventions on the part of the analyst:
he tried out guided fantasy and relaxation, tasks and time limits, and
argued for the return of the cathartic and hypnotic techniques that
Freud had definitively rejected. He experimented with systematically
gratifying rather than frustrating his patients yearnings, offering
affectionate embraces, extended times, and sessions on demand. His concerns
about the potential for the misuse of power went as far as mutual
analysis in which he was willing to exchange roles if the patient
wished. Recognising that the therapists countertransference was
as central to the therapy as the patients transference, he was
the first to recommend that supervision should be seen as a necessity
rather than a mark of failure.
This led to a regeneration of psychoanalytic theory and technique;
but it is not surprising that these brave moves met with mixed results.
Ferenczi took on patients that more cautious analysts would not have
touched with a bargepole - sometimes with unexpected success. Often,
however, he and his patients became impossibly enmeshed. Some were
unable to endure being away From him, and he himself became exhausted.
In 1930, he writes: I dedicate four and sometimes five hours
a day to my main patient, The Queen. Psychoanalysis, as
Im now practising it, takes much more out of one than previously
has been assumed. The next year: For the first time for
years, I am on holiday without my patients. Two years later
he died of pernicious anaemia, aged 60.
We can only applaud Ferenczis commitment, courage and imagination;
but we can also understand the horror with which Freud foresaw the
dismantling of the framework of his profession. The respectability
and even the survival of psychoanalysis hung in the balance, a Jewish
science within increasingly anti-Semitic regimes. A general retrenchment
followed Ferenczis death. His name was largely airbrushed out
of psychoanalytic history, rumours spread that he had gone mad, and
any mention of touch, active techniques or over-experimental attitudes
went underground. Nevertheless, Ferenczis work had an unacknowledged
but enduring effect on mainstream psychoanalysis. He is now recognised
as the forerunner of relational and intersubjective approaches, and
the link between classical psychoanalysis and Object Relations; but
clearly his work has just as much in common with humanistic methods
and attitudes, and must have contributed just as much to them through
the concerns he shared with the generation of analysts from which
some of the humanistic pioneers emerged.
The traditional conflict between humanistic and psychoanalytic approaches
thus started out as a conflict within psychoanalysis which was then
mapped on to the psychoanalytic/humanistic divide. It lived on within
psychoanalysis in the anti-psychiatry movements which sprang
up in Britain and the USA, and in the continuing tension between classical
and Object Relations approaches. What does this difference amount to?
The Difference - two therapeutic
philosophies
Ferenczi recognised the need for
the therapist to be alongside as well as opposite
the patient, but did not realise that each position carries constraints.
His experience suggests that we may have to make some kind of choice
as to which therapeutic dimension we are going to work through. Yet
whichever way we choose, the client seems to suffer.
Ferenczi went to an alongside
extreme because he thought the classical analysts had gone to an opposite
extreme. In neither case does the therapeutic relationship seem to
reflect the equal partnership that humanistic psychotherapy places
at the centre of the therapeutic encounter and psychoanalytic psychotherapy
relies on as the therapeutic alliance underpinning the
therapeutic process.
One way of looking at the problems
is to identify the different therapeutic philosophies that are involved.
In practice, all relational therapies operate on a mixture of the
two, but we can separate them out for the purposes of clarification.
At its purest, an alongside approach treats therapy as growth.
It assumes that the human condition is fundamentally harmonious, and
that problems arise through the impact of trauma rather than through
a surplus of destructiveness. This means that a change in external conditions
can assuage the legacy of the past, and the client can grow beyond the
trauma. With trust restored, the negative patterns set up for self-protection
should drop away, as there would be nothing to maintain them. This process
could be accelerated, and more positive patterns encouraged, by the
appropriate use of techniques. Since the clients problems are
located between the patient and the outside world, there is no therapeutic
rationale for the therapist becoming embroiled in them; negative transference
in particular is seen as something that holds up progress in therapy,
rather than something that the therapy happens through. A positive attitude
from therapist and client, an open and co-operative relationship between
more or less equal adults, and theoretical and practical know-how on
the part of the -therapist, should be enough to see the therapy through.
By contrast, and again at its purest, the opposite approach
sees therapy not as growth, but as untangling the knots which prevent
growth. It sees problems as arising from the inside, and being aggravated
by external t events and conditions; this may go back to a constitutional
difficulty in coping with lifes setbacks. By the time the patient
arrives for therapy, something intrinsic to her psyche is stopping her
from using the ordinary good experiences of life to recover from earlier
trauma. Since this something is unknown to the patient as
well as the analyst, it can only be discovered by providing an empty
relational space in which the unconscious dynamics can take form.
The analytic couch, the relative inactivity of the therapist, the frequent
sessions and the use of free association are all designed to open the
way to this process; and sooner or later, the patient slides into her
characteristic relational quagmire. The analyst attempts neither to
play into this nor out of it, but to keep interpreting the meaning of
the patients experiences and actions from a neutral position.
This may enable the patient to gain insight into what she is doing and
feeling, work her way through it, and resume her interrupted self-development.
Since growth is assumed to happen naturally once the impediments have
been cleared, giving the patient further assistance would be confusing
and interfering. The task of therapy is solely to clear the ground
for growth.
Probably no-one will be feeling particularly happy at this point. To
all but the most single-minded of therapists, the alongside
group come over as gullible fools,and the opposite group
as cold technocrats: exactly the terms in which the psychoanalytic and
humanistic lobbies have traditionally lambasted each other. We know,
of course, that therapies seldom go as smoothly as either of these accounts
suggests. Both approaches carry their own pitfalls, and combining them
can make things even worse.
Problems of the alongside
position
The therapeutic potential of the
alongside position depends on client and therapist seeing
and experiencing themselves and each other reasonably realistically;
it is only this that keeps the clients difficulties located
outside the therapeutic relationship. But we know that people tend
not to see themselves, let alone each other, realistically, and that
this is even less likely when one person is seeking emotional help
from another. As Freud discovered, the intimacy of the therapeutic
setting is tailor-made to arouse unrealistic hopes on the one hand,
and unjustified distrust on the other.
Any alongside
therapeutic relationship is vulnerable to transferential distortion,
but this vulnerability is greatest in a muddled therapeutic relationship;
we can see the potential for confusion in all alongside
approaches most clearly in a multipositional approach.
Some humanistic and integrative therapists advocate an approach like
Ferenczis, with the therapist attempting to conduct the therapeutic
relationship through both positions, shifting between them in response
to the process of therapy. Every therapy is different; but examples
of where this works well tend to involve clients who are already mature
and resourceful enough to make the best use of whatever is available
to them, taking inconsistencies more or less in their stride. But
even these clients do not and probably should not necessarily remain
in such an enviable psychological state throughout their therapy;
and in any case, as Ferenczi discovered, there are always those clients
who seem to make the worst use of whatever is offered them, by consistent
misinterpretation.
Thus the intrinsic tendency towards transference is increased when the
client is more disturbed or deprived, and when the therapist acts into
the developing transference - for example, by trying to make up for
her past and present losses, as Ferenczi tried to do. This leaves both
client and therapist in danger of an insidious seduction. Working through
the transference requires the client to retain or develop a minimal
sense that the therapist is not the real target of her feelings; it
is only this that keeps the focus on herself, rather than the fascinating
figure in front of her. But if too much from the past is unresolved,
what is transferred can become overwhelming, and the client may genuinely
think that the phantom appearing opposite her is the same
as the real person alongside her.
We can see how this could happen with my client. However frozen she
appears, a great deal is happening in relation to me, or rather, in
relation to who she takes me to be. She cannot look at me, but when
I look away from her she is devastated and quietly furious. In the consulting
room I seem impossibly intimidating, but once out of the door and walking
down the street, she pours her heart out to me. The other side of the
negative transference is the positive transference How easy it would
be to unwittingly divert her from her struggle with herself to a hyper-focus
on me, in a search for an external solution which could only bind her
to me.
The alongside position has its home in the co-operative
partnership of humanistic psychotherapy, and in the therapeutic alliance
on which psychoanalytic psychotherapy depends. But as the transference
sets in, the client becomes progressively less able, and also less
willing, to distinguish between the therapist as object of transference
in the opposite position, and the therapist as equal partner
in the alongside position. The space provided when the
therapist takes up the opposite position puts nothing
in the way of a regression in which everything can become very simple,
very concrete and very intense. If the therapist plays into this,
and the client gains satisfaction from the therapists action,
whether an active technique or a modification of the frame, she may
take it as a promise to deliver totally, for life; the more deprived
the client, the more likely she is to experience the therapist in
this way. With the alongside therapeutic relationship
collapsing, powerful and primitive expectations are lasered on to
the therapist, who is expected not just to understand but to fulfil
them. Disappointment then appears as anything from a horrendous betrayal
to an imminent threat to her continued existence. Many complaints
taken out against therapists arise from this kind of confused and
desperate state.
We can see now what Ferenczis more disturbed clients must have
gone through. Encapsulated within their psychic prisons, they could
neither see him realistically nor hold on to what they took from him.
The cherishing love he endlessly poured into them served only to convince
them that their well-being was his to give. Ferenczi tried to be everything
to his clients: not just a stand-in for their ancient transference hopes,
nor simply an equal partner alongside them as they struggled, but also
the parent of their dreams and his. Like them, he lost sight of the
distinction between the ordinary person he was in the therapeutic alliance
and the magical figure he appeared to be in the transference. His attempt
to subsume the transference relationship of the opposite
position into the realistic therapeutic alliance of the alongside
position looks not just risky, but misguided.
Problems of the opposite
position
Yet it does not help to
simply subtract the alongside position and its potential seductions
from the equation. This gives the distant stance criticised by Ferenczi,
the growth movement, and humanistic psychotherapy today.
The primary aim of the classical analyst is to maintain a clear projective
screen onto which the patients dynamics are cast; that is why
he considers that the less the therapist puts in, the better. But Object
Relations reminds us that human beings are irreducibly social: we cannot
live as persons outside relationship any more than we can live as bodies
outside oxygen. Imagine a keen scientist from Mars wanting to find out
what the human body was like in its normal state, without
the constant interference from the surrounding oxygen. But removing
a body from oxygen is not a simplifying act and does not give a pure
physical state; it is a forceful action resulting in an abnormal and
pathological physical condition. In the same way, depriving a person
of relationship is not a neutral act but a powerful negative intervention.
It does not show us the pure state of the psyche, but is likely to provoke
an intensely disturbed psychic state. As an intrinsically relational
creature, if the client does not feel that the therapist is in some
sense alongside her, she will assume that he is against her; the only
other possibility is to fall into a psychical black hole.
Just as Ferenczis positive interventions ended up seducing some
of his patients, the distant analysts negative intervention freezes
them out. In both cases, the therapeutic alliance between equal adults
dissolves into a regressed transference. This is always and inevitably
disastrous: therapists who work through the alongside relationship
lose their channel of therapy, while those who work through the opposite
position lose the essential therapeutic alliance without which no therapy
can proceed.
Mediation by containment
We can begin to see why
therapy cannot work if the alongside relationship is neglected,
any more than if the opposite relationship is ignored; but
there is no final answer to the dilemma we are faced with as therapists.
These twin therapeutic dangers go with the territory of psychotherapy;
they are always with us, and cannot be avoided. We can, however, think
beyond them to therapeutic relationships which don t succumb in either
of these ways. The terms I shall be using emerge from an Object Relations
context; but every approach will have its own means of understanding
the conflict of positions and the associated therapeutic hazards.
Like Ferenczi, Object Relations approaches tend to see psychotherapy
as a reparative personal relationship; yet like classical psychoanalysis,
they place transference in the centre and eschew non-interpretative
interventions. So how do they manage to avoid the worst of both worlds
?
How do any of their patients manage to avoid seduction by positive
transference on the one hand, or persecution by negative transference
on the other ?
One way of thinking about this is through a therapeutic factor common
to both positions. Instead of focusing on what the analyst does, Object
Relations shifts the focus to how the therapist is. Therapeutic presence
goes back to the freely-floating attention that Freud saw
as opening the way for the unconscious communion of analyst and patient.
It was taken forward in any number of Object Relations concepts: Kleins
containment ; Winnicotts facilitating environment,
environment-mother and subjective object; Bions
reverie ; and Balints splendid harmonious interpenetrating
mix-up. All these expressions are trying to reach towards the
notion that the therapists actions matter less than the state
of mind they come with and in which they are received. It is not so
much the words of the interpretation that are transformative, but the
atmosphere and intention in which the interpretation is made.
This crucial generic factor, which we can sum up rather arbitrarily
as containment; is a nebulous and difficult thing to pin
down, crossing many ordinary dichotomies of thought. Emotional openness
is needed, and also discriminating thought. It takes focused attention,
but a moment of deliberateness kills it. From the clients point
of view, its essential mark is simply that something about the therapists
presence or way of responding leads her to experience or accept herself
more clearly or more fully. From the therapists point of view,
containment is not a way out of commitment, but the precursor to responding.
Before he can bring the fragments from the clients expressions
and his own countertransference into a coherent whole, he has to simply
hold them. Only then can what emerges fit the therapeutic
moment; but his efforts to still his being and attune to the client
only come to fruition if they are met by the client. The process of
containment is above all an exchange.
For both therapist and client, the containing/contained exchange mediates
between the realistic therapeutic alliance and the regressed transference
relationship. For each, it connects the therapist who is alongside
the client with the transference figure who is likely to be opposite
her. But the important thing is that this happens without confusing
them. Where dramatic techniques and clever interpretations
risk drawing attention to the therapist, this does not happen in containment:
there is an enhanced awareness of the client, but no more than a background
awareness of the therapist. It is this that enables the client to draw
from the therapists presence without gaining a surrogate mother
or father. Some proponents of both the opposite and alongside
approaches explain the therapeutic process as the internalising of a
new parental figure.
I think this lays the therapy wide open to the dangers we have been
discussing, by making the therapist too important in his own eyes, and
in those of his clients or patients. The reparative relationship that
Object Relations speaks of does not mean that it becomes a new relational
structure, but rather that the client takes from the therapists
presence what she needs to bring her into closer touch with the good
aspects of her existing inner relationships. In doing so, she adds to
and reorders her existing internal world, without instituting a brand
new relational complex. This puts her in a better position to recognise
her blocks and self deceptions, so that she herself can go beyond them
in whatever way she chooses.
So when my client finally leaves therapy, I hope it will be with a shrunken
sense of me, and an amplified sense of herself and the richness and
complexity of her inner and outer relational worlds. Otherwise, she
will not really have become more free. But just as she cannot plan what
she will take from my presence, so I cannot choose what will be drawn.
Ferenczi tried to give his patients the specific experiences that he
and they thought they needed. Perhaps he could have trusted that his
thoughtful attention and inextinguishable personal qualities might have
been enough.
Where does this leave us?
To recapitulate: in answer
to the question of the relation between humanistic and psychodynamic
psychotherapy, I have suggested that the true division in psychotherapy
is more practical than theoretical. It does not depend on whether our
therapeutic approach is one that is usually classified as humanistic
or as psychoanalytic, but on whether the problems are focused outside
the therapeutic relationship or within it, and therefore whether the
active therapeutic position is opposite or alongside the client.
Whatever our theoretical approach, I believe this means committing ourselves
to one or other kind of therapeutic channel in each therapeutic relationship;
but this does not mean foregoing all forms of integration. If we choose
a pathway of change through being alongside the client,
we are free to use any combination of theories and techniques that makes
sense in this particular therapy, including psychoanalytic theory, just
so long as the clients attention is drawn to her own issues rather
than our actions. What we are not free to do is encourage a fixation
on ourselves by promoting an opposite position, and trying
to conduct the therapeutic work through both channels.
If the therapeutic route we choose is through the opposite
position, we are confined to a psychoanalytic approach of some kind,
because this is at present the only theory which explains what happens
when we do this. But we can add to this perspective by bringing insight
from any other source. Body Psychotherapy might foster a somatic dimension
to our awareness of ourselves and the client; concepts drawn from approaches
such as Gestalt can help us monitor the quality of our presence and
engagement. What we cannot afford to do is use the active techniques
on which these approaches usually rely, because we risk confusing the
client into thinking that they are being offered by the looming figure
opposite her, rather than the mundane person alongside her.
In the end, it is the containing and being contained interchange that
makes a therapy good enough if it succeeds, or not totally bad if it
fails; and since the conflict of positions is practical not theoretical,
this is true for all therapeutic approaches. Containment is just as
much a safeguard against the stereotypical overactive humanistic guru
as against the underactive psychoanalytic blank screen.
Humanistic therapists follow exactly the same profess of centring and
attuning to reach the appropriate intervention, or non-intervention,
and convey it in a way that can be used. The opposite and
alongside channels can both be the conduit of therapy, to
the extent that they facilitate containing and being contained. Inside
or outside an official psychotherapeutic relationship, it is this that
opens the way to the change which mysteriously becomes possible when
people meet together and achieve good faith.
Containment is just the Kleinians term. All approaches,
whether psychoanalytic or humanistic, must articulate what they see
as most essential in their own wav, with echoes of this same enigmatic
exchange. This holds the truly exciting possibility of a meeting ground
for a transtheoretical dialogue. Perhaps amore communicative psychotherapeutic
world is not unthinkable, however far away it seems to be.
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